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aBSTraCT This article examines the relationship between social protest and social media from the 
theoretical perspective of the Collective Action Research Program. While the literature shows strong 
empirical evidence for a positive relationship between social media use and incidents of social protest, the 
theoretical underpinnings of this relationship remain contested and often unspecified. In order to provide 
a stronger theoretical basis for this relationship this paper explores theories of collective action, focusing 
on how social media can assist in solving the dissident collective action problem. It argues that using 
collective action theory to understand social media and protest can better inform our understanding of 
how and why social media shares a positive relationship with incidents of social protest.
KEy worDS
social media, social protest, contentious politics, collective action theory
Author note
Cody McClain Brown :: University of Zagreb, Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb, Croatia :: 
codymcclain@gmail.com
4M
ED
IJ
SK
E 
ST
U
D
IJ
E 
 M
ED
IA
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 2
01
7 
.  8
 .  (
15
) .  
3-
22
C. McClain Brown : TwEETS anD MoBIlISaTIon: CollECTIvE aCTIon ThEory anD SoCIal MEDIa
IZVORNI ZNANSTVENI RAD / DOI: 10.20901/ms.8.15.2 / PRIMLJENO: 03.04.2017.
InTroDUCTIon
In April 2009, 10000 Moldavians, amid allegations of voter fraud, protested the outcome 
of the parliamentary elections in Chisinau (Barry, 2009). It was reported that the protesters 
used social media to help mobilise and organise the event (Barry, 2009). A few months 
later in June 2009, protesters in Iran began a months long campaign against the result 
of the Iranian presidential elections. Similarly to the protests in Moldova, social media, 
particularly Twitter, were seen as instrumental in aiding protesters’ ability to mobilise. The 
US State Department even requested that Twitter postpone an update of its network so 
that it would not conflict with the protesters’ ability to tweet (Grossman, 2009). In 2011, 
protests in Tunisia overthrew the country’s dictatorial regime. Once again Twitter was 
seen as great asset to the country’s dissidents (Delany, 2011). These protests were followed 
by similar protests in Egypt a few months later, which resulted in the resignation of Egypt’s 
long ruling dictator, Hosni Mubarak. Since then, these events have subsequently been 
included under the title of the ‘Twitter Revolutions’. 
Within the literature a debate has emerged in which skeptics view online activism 
as little more than ‘feel good’ expressions of preference that have little influence on 
mobilisation or participation in physical protest events (Morozov, 2009; Gladwell, 2010). 
However, an ample amount of research has offered an alternative perspective, arguing, 
and demonstrating that online activism shares a positive relationship with mobilisation 
for the purposes of social protest (Barbera et al., 2015; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Bastos 
et al., 2015; Bastos et al., 2014; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012; Segerberg and Bennett 2011; 
Bennett and Segerberg 2012). For example, Homero Gil de Zúñiga and colleagues find 
that “frequent users of social media were nearly 11 times more likely to participate in 
street demonstrations than were nonusers” (2012: 12) during demonstrations in Chile. 
Marco Bastos and colleagues (2015) equally demonstrate a strong relationship between 
an increase in online protest activity and a later onsite presence at a protest event for 
protests in Spain and the Occupy Movement. Zeynep Tufekci and Christopher Wilson’s 
(2012) work on the Arab Spring in Egypt found a statistically significant correlation 
between an individual’s use of social media and attendance at protest events. 
Therefore it seems quite clear that social media has become a useful tool for dissidents 
and protest. While there seems to be a strong consensus within the literature about the 
presence of a positive relationship between protest and social media use, there does 
not seem to be a consensus concerning the theoretical underpinnings that support this 
relationship (Breuer et al., 2015; Wolfsfeld et al., 2013; Tufekci, 2014). Some of the research 
structures its work around Resource Mobilisation Theory (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; 
Conover et al., 2013), while other work utilises the concept of Opportunity Structures 
(McAdam et al., 2001; Bennett and Segerberg 2012), others seem to combine various 
approaches (Breuer et al., 2015). For example Wolfsfeld and colleagues (2013) offer a very 
nuanced view in which the political context and contingencies are given priority, while 
other work focuses more on the relationship between social media and protest, observing 
and noting its dynamics, while paying less attention to the theoretical aspects of that 
relationship (Barbera et al., 2015; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012). Essentially, there seems to be 
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little agreement on the theoretical underpinnings of how social media helps individuals 
to collectively act, only that it does. This is not that surprising given how difficult it can 
be to observe the causal the mechanisms involved, the many factors involved with 
mobilisation (Barbera et al., 2015), the debate within the protest literature itself (Lichbach, 
1998a; Lichbach, 1997), the fact that social media is a relatively new phenomenon, and 
debates on how to conceptualise what is actually being studied (Theocharis, 2015).
Social media is considered to be such an influential phenomenon in the world of 
contentious politics that its use in social protest has even been argued to have done away 
with the collective action problem altogether. Tufekci (2014) expresses this sentiment, 
“Olson’s famous ‘free rider’ problem is thus largely irrelevant to most modern protests 
in nontotalitarian states: people who show up for protests are not accepting an onerous 
burden but rather are attracted by the engaged, powerful effervescence the protests 
create”(Tufekci, 2014: 207).
At first glance it seems hard to argue with this notion, given the research to date, and 
the advent of such events as the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, protests in Spain, Chile 
and elsewhere over the last decade. Anita Breuer and colleagues (2015) point out that an 
emphasis on the collective action problem should indicate that protest is unlikely, and yet 
protest seems to be occurring regularly. 
However, by assuming away the collective action problem we may be losing a potential 
area of theoretical consensus where the relationship between social media and social 
protest can be better understood and supported. In this paper I offer that we should not 
see social media as making the collective action or ‘free rider’ problem irrelevant, rather 
by focusing on the ways in which social media facilitates solutions to solving the collective 
action problem we can better understand and reconcile the relationship between protest 
and social media. Doing so, could help to further reduced the debate between ‘slacktivist’ 
skeptics and non-skeptics by providing a robust, unified theoretical framework through 
which research can find strong explanations as to why social media can so easily facilitate 
solutions to the collective action problem. 
In this paper I explore the relationship between social media and social protest from 
the perspective of Mark Lichbach’s Collective Action Research Program (CARP) (1998a). For 
the purposes of this paper I look at CARP’s theoretical understanding of how social media 
helps facilitate mass, social protest. For these purposes I use the following definition of 
social media: “forms of electronic communication (as websites for social networking and 
microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, 
ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos)” (Merriam-Webster, 2017).
While I am not the first to explore this area, I do take an approach that differentiates 
this paper from those found elsewhere in the literature (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; 
Gerbaudo, 2012; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012; Wolfsfeld et al., 2013; Tufekci, 2014; Breuer et al., 
2015) by using CARP’s theoretical framework. CARP has been used in the past to understand 
the dynamics of dissident and state action in social protest, insurgent participation in 
6M
ED
IJ
SK
E 
ST
U
D
IJ
E 
 M
ED
IA
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 2
01
7 
.  8
 .  (
15
) .  
3-
22
C. McClain Brown : TwEETS anD MoBIlISaTIon: CollECTIvE aCTIon ThEory anD SoCIal MEDIa
IZVORNI ZNANSTVENI RAD / DOI: 10.20901/ms.8.15.2 / PRIMLJENO: 03.04.2017.
rebellion and the dynamics of civil wars (Francisco, 2009; 2010; Weinstein, 2007; Brown, 
2013a). The literature on social media, though making mention of the collective action 
problem has not investigated CARP as means to understand the relationship between 
social media and social protest. My goal is to examine the way in which collective action 
theory can present a more robust theoretical understanding of how social media facilitates 
social protest. In order to do this I spend the next few paragraphs discussing the areas of 
disagreement between CARP and what Lichbach (1998a) refers to as structural theories of 
mobilisation, or SPOT.
Collective action theorists assume that individuals, especially when engaging in 
dissent, are self-interested and strategic (Olson, 1965; Lichbach, 1998b). When it comes 
to fostering collective action, actors face the problem of public goods and free riding, 
meaning that an individual’s desire for the public good, alone, is insufficient for her to 
engage in collective action. Most people prefer to remain at home, hoping someone 
else will attend the protest and attain the public good for them. Thus few attend the 
protest and the public good remains unattained. Lichbach’s five percent rule (Lichbach, 
1998b; Ainsworth, 2002), which stipulates that 95 % of the time less than five percent 
of a public good’s supporters will engage in collective action, supports the obstructive 
nature of self-interest in the creation of mass movements and mass protest. Hence would-
be protesters are left facing a collective action problem. The main contribution of CARP 
towards understanding all forms of collective dissent is in its ability to explain collective 
action through the solutions dissidents use to overcome their collective action problem 
(Lichbach, 1998b).
On the other side from this perspective is the structuralist approach (Tilly, 1978; 
McAdam et al., 1996; McAdam et al., 2001). This approach places an emphasis on the 
opportunity structures available to would-be dissidents and the mobilising structures 
within the society. Structurally created stratifications, such as class, gender, ethnic and 
racial divisions are assumed to allow coordination within the populace. Within those 
certain groups generated by stratification are cultural frames through which members of 
the group are assumed to be able to legitimate and motivate collective action (McAdam 
et al., 1996; Lichbach, 1998a). From this approach, understanding protest and collective 
action relies on looking at how groups in a society are structured and under what 
circumstances and for what public goods is collective action deemed legitimate.
In the following section I discuss in further detail why relying on the structuralist 
approach to explain the importance of social media in facilitating collective action 
continues to produce an incomplete understanding of social protest. What I show is 
that the structuralist approach assumes away the collective action problem with the 
presence of stratifying structures and cultural frames, while CARP, on the other hand, is 
able to incorporate the importance of community, whether it is based on race, gender, 
occupation, ethnicity or any other stratifying structures, into the possible solution groups 
that dissidents use to overcome their collective action problem. Looking at the influence 
of social media from the perspective of CARP provides us with a more theoretically robust 
basis to appreciate how social media is able to facilitate mass protest.
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The limitation with structural theories of protest from a CARP based perspective 
is that they tend to overlook the agency of individual actors in strategically creating, 
fostering and mobilising protest. At its worst, structural theories regard opportunity and 
mobilising structures in a manner where certain mobilising structures act as the invisible 
hand of protest. Social movements, and protest groups based on class, ethnicity or 
gender are thought to form spontaneously. The limitation in this approach is that in its 
conceptualisation is the assumption that technology, resources, or mobilising structures 
are able to create a great concern for the public good, and that this concern alone is 
capable of mobilising individuals into action. In the case of some of the research on social 
media the same limitations exist. For example, Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg 
(2012) introduce the idea of connective action as an explanation for mobilisation. In this 
concept it is assumed that connectivity itself overcomes the collective action problem. 
The guiding notion behind connective action is that through social media the cultural and 
identity frames discussed by McAdam and colleagues (2001) become more personalised 
to the user. Bennett and Segerberg (2012) offer that two elements constitute connective 
action. These are: first “political content in easily personalised ideas” that allow individuals 
to easily understand how they should feel about a common problem (Bennett and 
Segerberg, 2012: 744). The second involves,
Various personal communication technologies that enable sharing these themes. Whether through texts, 
tweets, social network sharing, or posting YouTube mashups, the communication process itself often 
involves further personalisation through the spreading of digital connections among friends or trusted 
others. Some more sophisticated custom coordinating platforms can resemble organisations that exist 
more online than off. (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012: 744)
While the first one seems hard to differentiate between the slogans generally used 
by protesters and dissidents, this second element raises the most pressing question 
concerning social media and forms of collective dissent, can online networks via social 
media, like Facebook and Twitter, function as a small group or community does offline? 
The reason this is important is given the fact that the collective action problem is 
less of a problem in small groups. In small groups participation is easier to monitor and 
thus prevents one’s proclivity to free ride. Individuals are less likely to free ride if there 
is a form of social sanction associated with sitting on the side lines during the action. 
Related to this idea is that within small groups, or, as Lichbach refers to them (1998b), 
communities, communication is the antecedent of action. If group members understand 
what other group members plan to do, that is the action is premeditated, then group 
members are more likely to act collectively, especially in the case where members are 
assigned a given role or expectation in that action. From this perspective we see that 
the very characteristics of mass mobilisation, its large size and the anonymity among the 
masses, are the very things that prevent it from developing. 
One way in which social media may be able to assist in overcoming the collective action 
problem is if it is able to expand the size of the group through the ease of communication 
while simultaneously continuing to operate with the same small group dynamics. Much 
of the literature explores the antecedent use of social media and the development of 
8M
ED
IJ
SK
E 
ST
U
D
IJ
E 
 M
ED
IA
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 2
01
7 
.  8
 .  (
15
) .  
3-
22
C. McClain Brown : TwEETS anD MoBIlISaTIon: CollECTIvE aCTIon ThEory anD SoCIal MEDIa
IZVORNI ZNANSTVENI RAD / DOI: 10.20901/ms.8.15.2 / PRIMLJENO: 03.04.2017.
physical social protest (Barbera et al., 2015; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Bastos et al., 2015; 
Bastos et al., 2014; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012), however, the specific question of whether 
small group dynamics, such as social sanction and commitment are operating as the 
motivators to participation, as far as I can tell, have not really be explored.
Some may take issue with the need to question the relationship between online 
groups and small group dynamics, arguing that online forms of collaboration already 
demonstrate that individuals, through the use of social media and technology, more easily 
overcome the free rider problem than economists and rational choice theorists observe 
(or assume) in the offline world. Certainly the evidence shows that online collaboration 
may not operate within the same logic of free riding. Open source software and websites 
like Wikipedia are examples; however, it is important to point out that in these cases 
collaboration can be its own reward, especially when the costs and risks are minuscule. 
A programmer who enjoys programming and writes open source software should not be 
readily compared to a protester facing Egypt’s riot police just because both of them are 
now able to coordinate their activities online. 
The issue with Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) connective action thesis, and other 
structural approaches in general, is that it operates on the assumption that caring for the 
public good will induce one to participate in its acquisition, which counters the premise of 
Mancur Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action and CARP’s entire perspective. Moreover, 
by assuming away the collective action problem we may be missing an area where we 
can expand the literature’s theoretical understanding of the relationship between social 
media and participation in social protest.
While collective action research acknowledges that you will always have zealots 
whose commitment, own selective incentives, such as being a full-time activist or would-
be leader in the resistance movement, and collective actions operate with small group 
dynamics, are all capable of pushing these individuals onto the streets, the central 
question to social protest, both those that use social media, and those that predate 
social media, is how is that commitment spread and shared in a way that attracts non-
zealots to take part in social protest. From this perspective the logic underscoring the 
concept of connective action seems limited as it assumes connectivity motives action. 
Moreover, the literature on social media and social protest, for the most part, looks at the 
possibilities and ease online social media has brought to organising, while overlooking 
the high costs that remain for collective dissent in many of the places that have witnessed 
the Twitter Revolutions. After all, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Iran are and were some of the 
most dictatorial and repressive regimes in the world. 
InCorporaTIng SoCIal MEDIa InTo CollECTIvE aCTIon ThEory
In theorising about solutions to the dissidents collective action problem, collective 
action theory (Lichbach, 1998b; Ferrara, 2003; Francisco, 2009; 2010; Brown, 2013a) uses 
four solution categories and 21 solutions through which dissidents can overcome their 
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dilemma and expand mobilisation for a public good beyond the participation of zealots. 
These categories are market, community, contract and hierarchy. In Lichbach’s game 
theoretic formulations (Lichbach, 1996), demonstrated empirically by Ferrara (2003) 
and Brown (2013b), it takes solutions from at least two different categories of solution 
groups in order to solve the dissident collective action problem. For example, solutions 
from market solutions work in tandem to hierarchy solutions. That is market solutions can 
assume a preexisting organisation or a preexisting community. All of this will be further 
explained and understood as the paper progresses. 
In the following sections I identify seven solutions to the collective action problem 
and discuss how each solution can theoretically interact with social media in solving 
the dissident collective action problem (see Table 1). These are: lower costs; increase 
the probability of winning; increase the probability of making a difference; common 
knowledge; common values; locate principals and patrons; and mutual exchange 
(Lichbach, 1998b). This is not necessarily an exhaustive use of the CARP’s solution 
categories, rather the solutions discussed are the one’s that seem most applicable to 
orienting our theoretical understanding of collective action and social media. In some 
cases social media may provide an easier means for dissidents to utilise a solution for 
mobilising. In other cases it is the solution that can enhance the effects of social media on 
dissident mobilisation.
Table 1. categories and solutions to the collective action problem
market solutions
The first category, market, operates on the cost/benefits to participating in collective 
dissent. Given the collective action problem, or individuals’ non contribution towards 
the public good, market solutions look at how exogenous variables to the equilibrium 
of the collective action problem can alter an individual’s decision calculus to participate. 
The costs to collective dissent are particularly important in understanding the how and 
why of mobilisation. Costs help constrain individual’s preferences. As costs are altered, 
preferences and thus the proclivity to act are also adjusted (Lichbach, 1998b). 
Social media can help with dissident communication; however, the reasons they wish 
to communicate have not changed as a result of the Internet age. Market solutions to 
the dissident collective action problem concern communication outside of the dissident 
organisation. The already organised dissidents need to inform would-be dissidents about 
solution categories
Market
Community
Hierarchy
Contract
solutions that interact with social media
Lower costs; Increase the probability of winning; 
Increase the probability of making a difference. 
Common knowledge; Common Values
Locate principals and patrons; 
Mutual exchange
10
M
ED
IJ
SK
E 
ST
U
D
IJ
E 
 M
ED
IA
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 2
01
7 
.  8
 .  (
15
) .  
3-
22
C. McClain Brown : TwEETS anD MoBIlISaTIon: CollECTIvE aCTIon ThEory anD SoCIal MEDIa
IZVORNI ZNANSTVENI RAD / DOI: 10.20901/ms.8.15.2 / PRIMLJENO: 03.04.2017.
the protest event. Information can change or inform an individual’s decision calculus. 
This is clearly evident in market category solution groups that involve dissidents lowering 
costs, increasing the probability of winning, and increasing the probability of making a 
difference, all of which can lead to increased mobilisation. 
Social media can facilitate lowering the costs of participating in several ways. Social 
media and the Internet have lowered the costs of communication. In the past dissidents 
had to pay for texts, tracts and pamphlets, and organisations had to pay for advertising. 
This placed at least some form of cost just on entering the marketplace of contentious 
politics, assuming first a preexisting organisation with some form of financial resources. 
Blogs, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and other forms of social media are all free avenues 
to publicise and share a dissident or dissidents’ message. In this way entry level financial 
costs of communication are nearly nonexistent.
Social media also lowers opportunity costs. Opportunity costs are the time, effort 
and energy spent on collective dissent that could be spent doing something else. This 
can range from having to choose to attend a meeting instead of watching your favourite 
television show, to the time and preparation it takes to avoid state surveillance if you decide 
to attend a clandestine dissident meeting. With near instantaneous communication, users 
no longer have to coordinate in person or at meetings.
Dissidents can also communicate with their distant counterparts in ways that were 
unimaginable a few decades ago. Partaking in an online chat requires less commitment 
of time and energy than having to physically attend a meeting. Moreover, in authoritarian 
systems this ability may lower the cost in terms of repression. Dissidents can meet online, 
often anonymously, without having to risk the danger and surveillance that comes with 
groups of people meeting in person. For example, organisers involved with the collective 
Anonymous and its first major campaign, Operation Chanology (a online and offline 
protest campaign against the Church of Scientology) engaged in lengthy discussions over 
missions, or Ops, tactics and targets via Internet Relay Chats (Coleman, 2014). Without 
the Internet and this ease of communication, and its space away from state surveillance, 
Anonymous would never have been able to coordinate its first protests against the Church 
of Scientology (Coleman, 2014).
While the Internet has helped dissidents communicate with each other, social media 
allows dissidents to share their message with a broader world in a way that is low cost, and 
open. For example, during Operation Chanology, Anonymous posted a video entitled “A 
Message to Scientology” on Youtube. The video has attracted five million views and helped 
the overall operation, and Anonymous, attract considerable media attention (Coleman, 
2014). Protests all around the world generate hashtags users can follow. Dissidents still face 
the problem of getting their message beyond their core followers. Barbera and colleagues 
(2015) find that periphery supporters online are key to disseminating information to a 
larger audience. Just as the advent of the Internet has lowered costs for businesses and 
firms by bringing faster and easier forms of communication, so too has social media 
reduced the costs of engaging collective dissent. 
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Secondly, social media helps increase the dissident’s belief in the probability of 
winning by reporting the protest event in real-time to an expanded audience. As events 
transpire, users are able to react, respond and witness what is happening even without 
being present at the protest event. Recent research (Barbera et al., 2015) found that 
during the Gazi park protest in Istanbul in 2013 dissidents at the centre of the protest, 
at its core, were able diffuse real-time information to a periphery of supporters, whose 
own engagement worked to disseminate this information further. This was especially 
important given that the Turkish media was not covering the protests. The researchers 
empirically observe how social media was able to circumvent the censored Turkish media, 
through speed and online diffusion, gaining international attention. 
The ability to see a protest as it unfolds can greatly increase the chances that 
nonparticipants will chose to participate. As Lichbach observes: “as a dissident’s estimate 
of the chances of victory increases, his or her participation in collective dissent also 
increases” (1998b: 62). Social media helps communicate victories quickly through live 
tweeting, updating posts, or making short videos or live streaming through various social 
media, assisting the chances of increasing participation.
Of course, this can go the other way. Witnessing repression or failures can have a 
reverse effect; however, dissidents and dissident leaders want to increase the belief in the 
probability of winning and therefore will manipulate facts and events to suit their goals. 
This is often why dissident numbers at protest events are inflated, while the state tries to 
diminish such numbers. In our contemporary world, a photo tweeted by protesters at an 
event can help more likely-protesters participate in that event in a time-frame that more 
quickly reaches the intended audience than was likely the case when the dispersion of 
visual images was dependent on traditional media. 
The next solution is: increase the probability of making a difference. This solution 
plays to the importance individuals place on their own efficacy. Social psychology has 
shown that among crowds individuals feel a diffusion of responsibility enabling them to 
look to someone else to act in the time of a crisis (Darley and Latane, 1968). For this reason, 
collective action also suffers from large groups as individuals believe someone else will 
take care of the problem for them. Therefore dissidents and dissident leaders want to 
convince individuals that their participation is crucial to success. The question here is, how 
can social media facilitate increasing individuals’ efficacy? 
So far, I have argued that the value of social media to dissidents is that it provides them 
with information once impossible to attain during the protest. However, information on 
social media prior to the protest may also assist in mobilising individuals by accentuating 
their ability to make a difference. For example, imagine an event organised on social 
media where users are able to commit to attending visibly, and other users are able to see 
the number of people who have committed to attend the protest event. Such a situation 
helps individuals understand that their attendance is crucial to the success of the event. 
The lower the number, the more an individual can understand the importance of her 
attendance. She can even be efficacious by inviting others to the event or by spreading 
12
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the news that the event is happening in the first place. Such actions, and their ease via 
social media can lead to feelings of individual importance amid the masses that instances 
of collective dissent try to muster.
One possible problem for dissidents on social media concerns how little or how much 
individuals must do in order to feel efficacious. Does simply sharing a tweet or liking a 
post satisfy their feelings of efficacy, thereby lowering the likelihood that an individual 
may attend a protest after feeling useful simply by sharing and stating an opinion about 
it online? Evgeny Morozov (2009) argues that such acts are low-cost and low impact, and 
essentially meaningless, while creating a good feeling for the actors. In this sense social 
media may increase feelings of efficacy, while also stripping away a would-be dissident’s 
actual effectiveness. If liking the protest satisfies as much as attending the protest, then 
social media may actually reduce effective efficacy among dissidents. 
Yannis Theocharis (2015) parses the debate by offering that liking or retweeting are not 
sufficient instances of political action, but rather represent aspects of preference sharing. 
Actions that involve posting symbolic photos, tweeting to politicians and policy makers, or 
sharing posts can represent actions (Theocharis, 2015), and it could be argued, do increase 
feelings of efficacy that further dissidents’ goals and causes, especially when considering 
that research shows that users sharing information from the core dissidents concerning 
an event likely helps dissidents attract more attention and possibly participants (Barbera 
et al., 2015). Gil de Zúñiga and colleagues’ (2012) study of protest in Chile explored which 
types of online activity shared a strong relationship with protesting, and found that users 
who used social media for expressing opinions and joining causes were more likely to 
protest. It seems then that rather than siphon off efficacious feelings, it enhances them, 
leading towards greater participation both online and offline. 
Returning to the access of the actual protest event via social media we see that 
increasing efficacy too can lead to increases in participation. As Lichbach notes: “as the 
dissidents and regime move closer to each other in strength the probability of a single 
dissident making a difference in the conflict increases. Collective dissent thus becomes 
more likely” (1998b: 84). Sharing with users the confrontational aspects of an event, both 
in its lead up and as it unfolds, can likely help propel people to participate. 
Again, we see how the instantaneousness of social media, coupled with the fact 
that the dissidents control the message as opposed to the news media, who dissidents 
used to depend on in order for an event to be reported, helps us understand how an 
individual’s feelings of efficacy can be increased by following events via social media. 
Even if nonparticipants fail to participate during a live event, witnessing the event, and 
learning about what transpired during the event can lead to their future participation 
(Francisco, 2004). 
To summarise, the relationship between the market solutions discussed above and 
social media is one in which we can understand the potential for social media to effectively 
aid dissidents’ efforts to solve the collective action problem through lowering the costs 
M
ED
IJ
SK
E 
ST
U
D
IJ
E 
 M
ED
IA
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 2
01
7 
.  8
 .  (
15
) .  
3-
22
13
C. McClain Brown : TwEETS anD MoBIlISaTIon: CollECTIvE aCTIon ThEory anD SoCIal MEDIa
IZVORNI ZNANSTVENI RAD / DOI: 10.20901/ms.8.15.2 / PRIMLJENO: 03.04.2017.
of communication, bettering dissident’s ability to communicate an imminent victory, 
and increase feelings of efficacy. And while the literature offers that online activity seems 
to increase feelings of efficacy, it would be beneficial if future work dealt with question 
specifically and further explore the extent to which an individual’s efficacy is satisfied by 
simply engaging with dissident content online or whether the desire to be efficacious is 
transferable to the offline world.
community solutions
The next and most likely solution group to aid dissidents on social media is the 
community solution group. The solutions of common knowledge and communication 
explore how communication within a given community can alter how members of 
that community act collectively (Lichbach, 1998b). Communication helps organise and 
coordinate dissidents by fostering mutual expectations within a certain community. The 
community category solution groups of common knowledge and common values are 
likely to be enhanced by the use of social media, while also assisting dissidents in solving 
their collective action problem.
Clearly, communication among dissidents is essential to mobilising, and the 
community category of solutions to the dissident collective action problem addresses the 
impact of communication directly. The first solution, common knowledge, argues that 
communication concerning protests will assist in aiding protest. The reason for this is 
the way in which preexisting communication can prepare dissidents for action. Knowing 
that if an individual acts, she will not act alone is very important for collective action. 
Moreover, communication prior to an event can tell dissidents the time and place of the 
event, and what circumstances may trigger a protest (common knowledge). A mutually 
understood signal concerning not just when to act, but how to act can also serve as the 
necessary antecedent to action (common values). In the online world this communication 
can be carried out among members of a group, followers of a particular profile, or users 
that interact with each other. It is clear that social media and the Internet can assist 
dissidents in communicating and coming to understand and agreeing on what type of 
actions or events can trigger a collective response. While dissidents have been able to 
communicate long before the advent of the Internet, we see that when coupled with the 
market solution category of lowering costs, communication is facilitated by online means 
of communication, which in itself, facilitates more communication, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of protest.
One of the pressing empirical questions for social media and protest is, how cohesive 
can online groups be? As mentioned in a previous section, the ability of an online 
community to function like a small group in which the members know and rely on each 
other, permitting elements of social sanction against members who fail to participate, 
and a cohesive environment in which communal obligation is shared among members 
is an empirical question. Evidence shows that in small, in-person groups these norms do 
develop (Olson, 1965), and can lead dissidents to act collectively (Brown, 2013b; Lichbach, 
1998b). If such relationships do exist among online groups, then we can understand 
how the use of social media is a great boon to dissident communities. The low cost of 
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coordination and the easy means to produce common knowledge, contribute to the 
likelihood of collective dissent when social media is involved. 
The relationship between the community solutions discussed above and social media 
is one in which we can appreciate the ease at which communities can communicate 
and share common knowledge and common values online to manifest itself in stronger 
communities, thereby increasing individuals’ chances of knowing when to act and how 
to act collectively. The question that remains is, are large and small online communities 
too diffuse to operate and behave with the the same cohesiveness and norms as small, 
offline communities when it comes to engaging in social protest? Moreover how do the 
dynamics of social sanction work when group members can be anonymous? 
Anecdotally, we can see elements of norms and social sanction at play among 
the most, no pun intended, anonymous members of the group Anonymous. During 
Operation Chanology, a subset of Anonymous members, referred to as the marblecake 
collective, produced propaganda, press releases and facilitated communication between 
different groups. Among the eight or so members of the collective one member violated 
a set of norms that existed both within the collective and within the broader populace 
of Anonymous, namely by trying to force the support of an action that many members 
seemed opposed to. As a result, the member herself became a target, and other members 
spread rumours about her and also released her personal information, known as doxing 
(Coleman, 2014: 72-73). 
What this story reveals is that norms or values within online communities develop and 
violating those norms can have negative repercussions. At the same time, it is curious that 
one of those repercussions involves removing a user’s anonymity by releasing personal, 
biographical information. Accepting that community solutions are often a necessary 
way of solving the collective action problem invites researchers to explore the dynamics 
of online communities, their norms, and boundaries, how their members relate to one 
another and how these aspects develop into solutions to the dissident’s collective action 
problem. 
hierarchy solutions
The next solution category assumes a preexisting organisation. Just as community 
solutions assume a community, hierarchy assumes an organised dissident entity, that 
is more often than not, hierarchical, meaning it has leaders. The hierarchy category of 
collective action solutions is important as it coincides with both market and community 
solutions. That is, a preexisting organisation is the ‘visible’ hand that lowers costs, provides 
information, and increases efficacy. As it relates to social media and online activism, the 
preexisting organisation, even if decentralised like the hacker group Anonymous, has 
more active members that disseminate information online, post photos designed to 
lower costs, increase efficacy, or share common knowledge. With social media, the issue 
of leadership remains important, but seems to have been overlooked by the literature. 
Whether or not the revolution will be tweeted depends on who is doing the tweeting. 
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Therefore, we must first recognise that tweets and posts come from someone. The use 
of social media assumes that there already exists an interested party acting for the public 
good. Turnout for an event can likely be linked to the size and type of that organisation. 
For example, imagine the labor union the AFL-CIO tweeting the time, location and cause 
of a worker’s rally versus your local Anarchist collective tweeting the same event. The AFL-
CIO has 12 million members, 88 thousand followers on twitter, a SuperPac and allies in 
the halls of the US Congress. Clearly an event announced on social media by the AFL-
CIO will receive more notice than an event from a lesser organisation. The bigger the size 
of the preexisting organisation, the more likely its message will trend or pick up interest 
from third parties, as media and other well known profiles, retweet or comment on the 
original message. Therefore, in focusing on the theoretical understanding of social media 
and mobilisation it is necessary to note the type and size of the organisation operating 
on social media. When it comes to empirically testing the influence of social media on 
protest, an important research question is, does who and how big an online entity is in the 
real world, likely effect the number of participants on the street?
While Barbera and colleagues (2015) discuss the importance of spreading protest 
information flows from the core to the periphery, the authors do not explore who or what 
organisations the core are comprised of. Yet, who is tweeting the tweets might play a 
important factor in how the information is further disseminated. By understanding the 
importance of hierarchy solutions to the dissident collective action problem, we can 
also understand the importance of focusing on who organises, composes and posts the 
original dissident messages on social media, and its consequences for participation. 
At the same time small dissident organisations can likely make use of social media 
in finding and locating supporters for their cause. This brings us to one of the most 
important hierarchy solutions to the dissident collective action problem, finding and 
locating principals and patrons (Walker, 1983; Lichbach, 1998b). In the world of protest, 
patrons offer material resources to dissident organisations. While, principals offer skills, 
know how, and other resources to dissident organisations. Francisco (2010) observes 
that in most cases, dissident leaders come from a higher socio-economic background 
than their followers, indicating that their education and resources help their efforts at 
organising and mobilising. 
Financing from patrons, wealthier individuals or organisations, helps social movements 
attain, otherwise, costly resources for dissent. This money can be used to finance full-time 
activists, help purchase resources that help lower costs, or provide other solutions to the 
collective action problem. One example of a dissident organisation receiving patronage is 
the Centre for Peace Studies in Croatia, which is funded by the EU, and even the Croatian 
state, and yet often engages in dissident and protest activities. On a more negative and 
violent side, it is well established that wealthy Gulf States have served as patrons to Islamist 
terror organisations, helping finance Hamas, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Al Nursa 
Front, to name a few. Patronage is a tried and true solution to the dissident collective 
action problem. 
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The question here is, who is considered a patron on social media, and how can their 
patronage help with dissident mobilisation? I explore answers to this question in two 
ways. The first looks at material and financial contributions. Here we see how the Internet 
and social media can help individuals and organisations raise money for their cause 
via crowdfunding services, such as gofundme, Patreon, and kickstarter. For example, 
in 2016, protesters of the North Dakota Access Pipeline raised over one million dollars 
via crowdfunding (Associated Press, 2016). The money was used to house and feed 670 
protesters as the North Dakota winter took hold on the protesters’ camp (Associated 
Press, 2016).
The ability to crowd source funding via the Internet means that anyone in the world 
can easily contribute to a cause they care about. Prior to the Internet, dissidents had to 
organise their own fundraisers, meet in person with benefactors, and provide selective 
incentives to donors. For example the organisation Green Peace raised funds for its 
first campaign to the island Amchitka from a concert in 1970 featuring the popular folk 
artists Joni Mitchell and James Taylor. Now, one can imagine how much more difficult it 
is to organise a concert than setting up a fundraising campaign on a preexisting online 
platform.  We can also assume then, that online forms of fundraising lead to easier access 
to material resources, which leads to more easily aiding dissidents’ mobilisation efforts. 
The second form of patronage is more virtual than material, and that is when 
prominent organisations or individuals online, those with a strong following, or support, 
disseminate a dissident group’s message, actions or information to their followers via 
Facebook likes, posts, retweets or other means of online sharing. For example, Leonardo 
Dicaprio tweeted his support for the protesters in North Dakota to all of his 17 million 
followers. His tweet received 3524 retweets, 6874 likes, and 337 replies. At the same time 
his tweet itself became the subject of several news stories, mentioning his and others 
support for the small group of protesters in North Dakota. Another example involves 
actress and movie star Shailene Woodley, who visited the protest site in North Dakota and 
was arrested by police during a two hour livestream to her Facebook followers (she has 
over one million followers). This event was not only carried live to her followers, but also 
garnered its own share of news stories. 
The question is whether or not this form of virtual or online support contributes to 
the groups’ mobilisation efforts? Publicity of a cause certainly matters to dissidents and 
therefore this online support via shares, likes, tweets and retweets, has the potential to 
aid the dissident group. As Lichbach explains, “Potential dissidents, because of imperfect 
information, might not even know that a dissident group exists. Dissident groups need in 
the first instance to alert dissidents to the possibility of contributing to [collective action], 
a course of action that might never had occurred to them” (Lichbach, 1998b: 89). 
Social media, whether DiCaprio’s 17 million followers or the news stories generated 
by his tweet in support for the North Dakota protesters, circumvents the gatekeeping of 
traditional media, whose editorial restriction might refrain in promoting the dissidents’ 
cause, while also facilitating easier access to a much wider audience. Moreover, it is 
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essentially cost free to the dissident organisation, whereas before the advent of social 
media publicity took more time and cost more. In this sense online patronage can 
certainly, more easily solve the dissident collective action problem. Of course, to make use 
of this publicity, dissidents must already have a preexisting organisation.
To summarise, the relationship between the hierarchy solutions discussed above and 
social media is one in which we can understand how the purpose, size and notoriety of 
preexisting organisations’ use of social media influences physical turnout to a protest 
event. Furthermore the use of patrons on social media and their influence on social 
protest events should also be further explored. Social media has most certainly eased 
dissident organisations’ means of finding patrons in both a material sense via fundraising, 
crowdsourcing platforms, and in a virtual sense via publicity from well followed and 
known online entities. 
contract solutions 
Contract solutions involve the evolution of spontaneous acts of dissent into established 
normative institutions that come to govern dissidents’ behaviour amid their collective 
endeavours. The literature sites peasant communes, Soviets, revolutionary parties, 
committees, and church groups (Lichbach, 1998b: 129; Wood, 2003). With the Internet 
serving as a new environment for connectivity, forms of individual and collective action, 
as well as communication, we can easily see how new norms and institutions not only 
develop, but are needed to govern behaviour in cyberspace. In terms of online activism, 
especially among ‘Hacktivist’ groups like the decentralised Anonymous, institutionalised 
norms seem to be very important in facilitating collective dissent. As one author describes, 
Anonymous is a classic ‘do-ocracy’, to use a phrase that’s popular in the open source movement. As the 
term implies, that means rule by sheer doing: Individuals propose actions, others join in (or not), and then 
the Anonymous flag is flown over the result. There’s no one to grant permission, no promise of praise or 
credit, so every action must be its own reward. (Norton, 2011)
As idealistic as this sounds, it is difficult to accept that individuals just act regardless of 
whether or not they expect others to do the same. While members of Anonymous may not 
expect material rewards or incentives for their participation, they do not exist in a vacuum. 
This is where the idea of institutionalised norms seems crucial to the functioning of online 
dissent, namely an established norm of reciprocity. Lichbach (1998b) offers that dissidents 
may engage in a regimen of mutual exchange, in which an individual’s support for a 
form of dissent will be reciprocated by others’ support for her act of dissent. In the online 
world, established norms of reciprocity can aid in the exchange of acting collectively in 
support of certain causes among dissidents. Anonymous’ operations in which individuals 
from all over the Internet engage in hacking certain targets, from the mobile phones of 
alleged rapists, to Denial of Service Attacks that bring down targeted websites, to the 
release of a target’s personal information to as many locations on the Internet as possible 
are organised through this corner of the Internet’s norms of reciprocity. That is, if one 
member, or a set of members begin the acts they know others will assist and visa-versa. 
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In the case of Anonymous, these norms developed not out of collective dissent, but 
first out of spontaneous acts of pranking, for the ‘lulz’. Through the act of pranking, the 
norms of reciprocity became ingrained within the Anonymous online community and 
have since led to further, more elaborate, choreographed dissident actions on the Internet 
(Coleman, 2014). 
In this sense we can see how the Internet, as a space for collaboration that is not 
constrained by geography and one that has become its own virtual world, led to the 
establishment of norms among certain users. Message boards on the websites 4chan 
and subreddits on Reddit have often developed their own culture and norms of expected 
behaviour (Trammel, 2014). Out of such entities, groups like Anonymous have formed and 
engaged in online and offline collective action. 
The question then is, how does this online activity relate to mass protest on the streets 
and squares of cities? Here we see the evidence of how solving the dissident collective 
action problem requires at least two solutions from two different solution groups. A group 
like Anonymous, acting online can both serve as a preexisting organisation or as a patron 
to other organisations, while at the same time members of Anonymous, whose norms 
of reciprocity have already been established may form a smaller community in which 
community solutions work more effectively, and decide to move their online dissent 
offline and to the streets. Evidence of this already exists as we saw members, or purported 
members of Anonymous begin a campaign online and then engage in physical protests 
during Operation Chanology (Coleman, 2014). More recently, events like the Anonymous 
organised ‘Million Mask March’ on 5 November, Guy Fawkes Day, in the UK attracted 20 
thousand protesters (Gayle, 2016).
To summarise, the relationship between the contract solutions discussed above 
and social media is one through which we can understand social media’s influence in 
effectively aiding dissidents’ efforts to solve the collective action problem through the 
establishment of norms of mutual exchange between actors online. The question that 
remains is how easily are norms of online exchange and collaboration transferable to the 
offline world? And what processes or other collective action solutions are involved in this 
transfer?
ConClUSIon
This paper has attempted to demonstrate how integrating the theoretical framework 
of the Collective Action Research Program with the research on the link between social 
media on social protest could provide a useful orientation to better understand the 
theoretical foundations of this relationship. Out of the 21 solutions to the dissident 
collective action problem developed by Lichbach (1998b) and used in much of the 
literature on social protest, I have focused on seven solutions from all four solution groups 
and attempted to theoretically understand how their relationship with dissidents, would-
be dissidents, and dissident organisations can be influenced by social media. Placing the 
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relationship of social media and protest within CARP can offer the literature a theoretical 
consensus that seems to be currently lacking. At the same time it can offer a more robust 
and complete theoretical framework by overcoming the shortcomings in the structuralist 
approach (SPOT).
Online activism and social media offer a very fruitful area of research for contentious 
politics. With the online presence of such a vast amount of information and the ability to 
track and observe the audiences’ response to that information, incorporating social media 
into collective action research has the potential to better inform our own understanding 
of social protest and dissident behaviour in general. 
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TvITovI I MoBIlIzaCIJa: 
TEorIJa KolEKTIvnog DJElovanJa 
I DrUšTvEnI MEDIJI
Cody McClain Brown
SažETaK Ovaj rad ispituje odnos između građanskih prosvjeda i društvenih medija iz perspektive 
istraživačkog programa kolektivnog djelovanja. Dok literatura ukazuje na snažne empirijske dokaze 
o pozitivnom odnosu između upotrebe društvenih medija i pojave građanskih prosvjeda, teorijsko je 
podupiranje ovog odnosa osporavano i često neodređeno. Nastojeći pružiti snažniju teorijsku osnovu za 
taj odnos, ovaj rad istražuje teorije kolektivnog djelovanja fokusirajući se na društvene medije i njihovu 
ulogu u rješavanju problema kolektivnog djelovanja onih koji se suprotstavljaju službenoj politici. Rad 
promišlja kako upotreba teorije kolektivnog djelovanja za razumijevanje društvenih medija i prosvjeda 
može poslužiti boljem razumijevanju pozitivnog odnosa između društvenih medija i pojave građanskih 
prosvjeda.
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